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COMMENT
EDUCATION AS A TRADE OR BUSINESS EXPENSE
UNDER SECTION 162(a)
by Ronald S. Webster
While educational expenses have never enjoyed specific treatment in the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, they may be allowable as trade or business
expense deductions under section 162(a).1  To qualify under section
162(a), expenditures must be incurred as business 2 and not personal ex-
penses," and must be "ordinary and necessary."'4  Amounts expended for
the acquisition of assets having an extended and determinable useful life
are not deductible as current expenses under section 162(a), but are capital
expenditures, 5 and are recoverable through depreciation deductions over
the useful life of the asset.6 The scope of this Comment will be to determine
when educational expenses are deductible under section 162(a) as "ordi-
nary and necessary" business expenses.
Early judicial views on the deductibility of educational expenses reflected
both the capital and personal nature of acquiring an education, and conse-
quently the inherent difficulty in obtaining the deduction. Dictum in Welch
v. Helvering7 characterized "learning" as a tool "with which to hew a path-
way to success," and the cost of acquisition, as with any capital asset, "is not
an ordinary expense of the operation of a business."'8 In Hill v. Commis-
sioner9 a teacher seeking renewal of her teaching license was permitted to
deduct summer school expenses incurred in satisfaction of the renewal re-
1 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 162(a) provides: "There shall be allowed as a
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business . ... "
2 See United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963). The Court in Gilmore
recognized that § 162(a) imposed the restriction on a deduction that "the expense
item involved must be one that has a business origin." Id. at 45. Gilmore resolved
the conflict of whether an expense is personal or business in nature by viewing "the
origin and character of the claim with respect to which an expense was incurred,
rather than its potential consequences upon . . . the taxpayer." Id. at 49.
3 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 262 provides that "no deduction shall be allowed for
personal, living, or family expenses."
4 The term "necessary" imposes the requirement that the expense be appropriate
and helpful for the development of the taxpayer's business. Commissioner v. Tellier,
383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966). See also Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933).
"Ordinary" has been defined as the "usual" or "accepted" practice of the business
in which the taxpayer is involved. Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940). But
this interpretation seems to have been replaced by Tellier, in which the Court said:
"The principal function of the term 'ordinary' in section 162(a) is to clarify the
distinction, often difficult, between those expenses that are currently deductible, and
those that are in the nature of capital expenditures, which if deductible at all, must
be amortized over the useful life of the asset." 383 U.S. at 689-90.
5 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 263; see United States v. Akin, 248 F.2d 742 (10th
Cir. 1957).6 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167; Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-i, T.D. 7203, 1972-2
CuM. BULL. 12.
7 290 U.S. 111 (1933).8 1d. at 115-16.
9 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).
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quirement. The court distinguished between schooling that enabled a tax-
payer to maintain a present position, and that which qualified the tax-
payer to attain a new position, the former being deductible as an "ordinary
and necessary" business expense. The taxpayer in Coughlin v. Commis-
sioner1" was an attorney whose responsibility to his firm required him to
maintain a current knowledge of tax law. The court allowed a business
expense deduction for the expenses of attending a Federal Tax Insti-
tute, including tuition and travel expenses, on the basis that the "trade or
business" aspects of fulfilling his professional duty outweighed the personal
nature of an incidental increase of the taxpayer's general knowledge.
In an effort to provide statutory guidelines for the deduction of educa-
tional expenses, the Treasury Department in 1958 promulgated section
1.162-511 of the Income Tax Regulations, which was amended in 1967.12
Both sets of regulations defined the deduction according to the requirements
of section 162(a), but the taxpayer's success under the 1967 provisions has
proved to be less frequent than under the 1958 regulations.
I. THE 1958 REGULATIONS
Adopting language similar to the Hill and Coughlin decisions, the 1958
regulations provided that a taxpayer who undertook an education "primarily
for the purpose" of maintaining or improving skills required in his employ-
ment or meeting the express requirements of his employer, could deduct his ex-
penditures as ordinary and necessary business expenses. 18  Section 1.162-
5(b) denied the deduction if the education was undertaken primarily for
the purpose of obtaining a new position, or fulfilling general educational
aspirations of a personal nature. 14
The courts, prior to any mention of educational expenses in the regula-
tions, recognized that a taxpayer's education might reflect several motives-
personal, business, or capital-none of which were apparent from the nature
of the education itself. 1' Therefore, the 1958 regulations required a deter-
mination by the courts of the taxpayer's primary purpose in obtaining the
educational expense he sought to deduct under section 162(a).16  The
10203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953).
11 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5, T.D. 6291, 1958-1 CUM. BULL. 63.
'
2 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5, T.D. 6918, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 36.
1 8 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (1958) provides:
Expenditures made by a taxpayer for his education are deductible if they
are for education (including research activities) undertaken primarily for
the purpose of:
(1) Maintaining or improving skills required by the taxpayer in his
employment or other trade or business, or
(2) Meeting the express requirements of a taxpayer's employer, or the
requirements of applicable law or regulations, imposed as a condition
to the retention by the taxpayer of his salary, status or employment.
14 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 63.
15 See notes 7-10 supra, and accompanying text.
16 See, e.g., Ronald F. Weiszmann, 52 T.C. 1106 (1969), ajf'd, 443 F.2d 29 (9th
Cir. 1971). In attempting to resolve whether the taxpayer (a patent trainee)
obtained a law degree in order to improve his job skills, or whether he intended to
improve his position by becoming a patent attorney, the court said: "The test is what
was his primary purpose, and from the facts of the case, it is demonstrable that the
petitioner's primary purpose in undertaking a legal education did not lie in his desire to
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question of "primary purpose" was one of fact, the burden resting upon the
taxpayer to show that the primary purpose in undertaking the education was
to maintain employment skills or to meet employer requirements.17
Education To Maintain or Improve Skills. Section 1.162-5 (a) provided that
expenditures for education, undertaken "primarily for the purpose" of main-
taining or improving skills required by the taxpayer in his employment,
were deductible. The taxpayer could satisfy this requirement by showing
that "it is customary for other established members of the taxpayer's trade
or business to undertake such education . . ... 's This test of "customari-
ness" was similar in definition to the "ordinary" requirement of section 162.19
An important change affecting the deductibility of educational expenses
occurred in 1966, just prior to the amendment of the 1958 regulations, with
the new interpretation by the courts of "ordinary" expenses under section
162(a).2 0  In Campbell v. United States21 the court allowed a forensic
pathologist employed with the medical examiner's office to deduct expenses
of receiving a law degree. The evidence supported the fact that a law de-
gree would aid the petitioner in his work, as the medical investigations in-
volved many legal considerations. 22  Rejecting the Commissioner's conten-
tion that it was not customary for a forensic pathologist to acquire a law de-
gree, the court said that "customariness" was by no means controlling,
"[o]therwise the person who is a pioneer in his field in attempting to main-
tain and improve his skills beyond what his fellows have done, would be
denied a tax deduction .... ,,23 This apparent abandonment by the
courts of looking to the custom of the taxpayer's industry to decide whether
continue working ... as a patent trainee." Id. at 1109. See also Ronald F.
Weiszmann, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1201 (1972), af 'd, 483 F.2d 817 (10th Cir.
1973).
17 James J. Condit, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1306 (1962), aff'd, 329 F.2d 153(6th Cir. 1964). Where the taxpayer had coexistent motives in obtaining an education,
the deduction was not denied under the 1958 regulation because all motives did not
comply with § 1.162-5 of the regulations. Rather, it was the primary purpose that
determined the deductibility. See United States v. Michaelsen, 313 F.2d 668 (9th Cir.
1963); Sandt v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1962). See also Comment, The
Deductibility of Educational Expenses: Administrative Construction of Statute, 17
BUFFALO L. REV. 182 (1967).
18Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(1) (1958). See William J. Brennan, 22 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1222 (1963), in which the petitioner, an estate and gift tax examiner for the
Internal Revenue Service, was allowed to deduct tuition costs for law school. The
court said that it was the custom, if not the rule, that examiners are attorneys; there-
fore, the taxpayer's primary purpose in obtaining a law degree was to improve the
skills required by his business.
19 See note 4 supra.
20 Id.
21 250 F. Supp. 941 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
22 "The pathologist is obviously confronted with crimes and their legal definitions;
evidence questions; questions of decedent's estates especially when property is found
on the body brought into the office; domestic relations' law; torts; and a number of
others." Id. at 942.
23 Id. at 945. See also Donald P. Frazee, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1086, 1089
(1963), in which the Tax Court stated: "We do not read the regulations as requiring
the disallowance of deductions for educational expenses where the deduction is under-
taken primarily for the purpose of maintaining or improving skills ...even though




educational expenses were for maintaining skills required in his employ-
ment was later reflected in the 1967 regulations. 24
Education To Meet Express Requirements. Section 1.162-5(a) (2) of the
1958 Income Tax Regulations allowed a deduction for the costs of an educa-
tion undertaken "primarily for the purpose" of meeting express require-
ments of the taxpayer's employer "imposed as a condition to the retention by
the taxpayer of his salary, status, or employment. '25 The expenditures were
deductible only to the extent that they were incurred for the minimum educa-
tion required by the employer, and then only if such requirement was im-
posed for a bona fide business purpose of the taxpayer's employer.
Travel as a Form of Education. In a 1951 case, Manoel Cordozo,26 a
professor sought to deduct the expenses of a European trip undertaken for
study and research so that he might "improve his reputation for scholar-
ship and learning."' 27 The tax court stated that since the trip was not re-
quired by his contract of employment or by the authorities of the univer-
sity, the expenses were not deductible as ordinary and necessary business
expenses. Section 1.162-5(c), a part of the 1958 regulation, adopted this
approach and provided that a "taxpayer's expenses for travel (including
travel while on sabbatical leave) as a form of education shall be considered
as primarily personal in nature and therefore not deductible. '28
This provision seemed to deny all sabbatical expenses for traveling pro-
fessors. Therefore, in 1964 the Commissioner in Revenue Ruling 64-176
declared that "the rule in section 1.162-5(c) . . . applies to travel which
is undertaken primarily for the broadening, cultural value of travel, as
such, and which has no direct relationship to the individual's trade or busi-
ness." 29  According to the ruling, travel which has a direct relationship
to the conduct of the taxpayer's trade or business may, under certain unde-
fined circumstances, be considered as the equivalent of education, and
therefore would be deductible under section 1.162-5(a) of the regulations.
The Commissioner did not clarify under what circumstances the travel would
be sufficiently connected with the taxpayer's employment so as to allow the
deduction, and it was not until the 1967 amendment to section 1.162-5 that
exact guidelines were formulated.30
II. THE 1967 REGULATIONS
The 1958 education expense regulations were amended in 196731 in
order to provide a more complete categorization of the deductibility guide-
lines and to eliminate the difficult factual determinations required by the
24 See notes 37-54 infra, and accompanying text.
25 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(2) (1958).
26 17 T.C. 3 (1951).
27 Id. at 4.
28 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(c) (1958).
29 Rev. Rul. 64-176, 1964-1 CUM. BULL. 89.
30 See notes 94-97 inf ra, and accompanying text.
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5, T.D. 6918, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 36.
1973]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
1958 regulations, most notably in the area of "primary purpose." Realizing
that attempting to ascertain a taxpayer's primary purpose "leads us into
'the mire of the no-man's land of subjective intent,' ",32 the new regulations
do not require the taxpayer to establish his primary purpose in undertaking
the education. The objective categories of deductible expenses include ex-
penditures for an education which (1) maintains or improves skills re-
quired by the individual in his employment or other trade or business; or,
(2) meets the express requirements of the individual's employer, or the re-
quirements of applicable law or regulations, imposed as a condition to the
retention by the individual of an established employment relationship,
status, or rate of compensation. 8
The Internal Revenue Service also recognized the earlier case law prob-
lems in attempting to define the tax characteristics of obtaining an educa-
tion,3 4 and provides that the non-deductible educational expenses "are
personal expenditures or constitute an inseparable aggregate of personal and
capital expenditures and, therefore, are not deductible as ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses."35  Such expenses, according to the regulations, are
those expenditures for an education which is (1) required of him in order
to meet the minimum educational requirements for qualification in his em-
ployment or other trade or business, or (2) part of a program of study
being pursued by him which will lead to qualifying him in a new trade or
business. The expense for education, if it falls within either one of the above
categories, is automatically denied as a deduction under section 162(a) even
though the education may qualify under the deductible categories.
The 1967 regulations were intended to be more liberal in favor of the tax-
payer than were the 1958 regulations, by no longer requiring him to estab-
lish his primary purpose in incurring the educational expenses.36 But, as
will be apparent upon examination of case law, the 1967 regulations have
only increased the frequency of factual determinations made by the courts,
and have not liberalized the ultimate results in favor of the taxpayer who
seeks a deduction under section 162(a).
A. Maintaining or Improving Skills
For a taxpayer to establish that an education was incurred to maintain
or improve the skills required in his employment, he must have undertaken
the education in question while he was engaged in a trade or business, the
education gained must bear a direct and proximate relationship to his trade or
business, and the skills he seeks to maintain or improve by the education
must be "required" by his trade or business. The taxpayer does not have
to prove that the primary purpose in receiving the education was to maintain
32 Marshall L. Helms, Jr., 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1020, 1023 (1968).
33 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5, T.D. 6918, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 36.
84 See notes 7-10 supra, and accompanying text.3 5 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b) (1967).




or improve his skills, but only that the education in fact does improve or main-
tain his skills required in his present employment.
Carrying On a Trade or Business. In John C. Ford37 the taxpayer was a
substitute teacher in a California high school. After four years of teaching,
he left his position and traveled to Norway, where he studied anthropology
and linguistics at the University of Oslo. During this period the taxpayer
was employed as a substitute teacher for a school operated by the Depart-
ment of the Army, but actually taught for only one day. After one year of
schooling in Norway, Ford returned to California and resumed teaching.
The Commissioner argued that the one year of education undertaken in
Norway was not deductible under section 162(a) because the taxpayer was
not engaged in a trade or business when he incurred the expense, claiming
that Ford had "voluntarily and indefinitely abandoned any active pursuit of
the teaching profession."' a8 The Tax Court upheld the deduction, stating
that "mere membership in a profession is not in itself the 'carrying on' of a
trade or business," but since the taxpayer had applied for a teaching job
during the period he attended classes and had actually taught, more than
"mere membership in the teaching profession" was involved.3 9
If the taxpayer severs his association with his trade or business com-
pletely in order to undertake an education, the courts make a distinction
between a "temporary" student and an "indefinite" student in allowing or
denying the expense deduction. In dealing with the question of whether
the taxpayer was engaged in a trade or business when he attended graduate
school in engineering, the court in Berry Reisine40 concluded that the major
issue was whether the education in question "represented a temporary hiatus
in an engineering career . . .or was such sojourn of such a character as to
categorize his trade or business as that of a student for an indefinte period
of time?" 41 The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that Furner v. Com-
missioner42 applied, stating that here the petitioner had barely begun his em-
ployment as an engineer when he decided to resume his education. "His
projected program was for an indefinite rather than a limited period of
time, '43 and, therefore, the taxpayer was not engaged in a trade or business
at the time he incurred the educational expenses.
37 T.C. 1300 (1971), af'd sub nom. Ford v. Commissioner, CCH 1973 STAND.
FED. TAX. REP. 9798 (9th Cir. Nov. 9, 1973).
a8 1d. at 1304.
39 Id. See also Furrer v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968), acquiesced
in 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 73. In this case the taxpayer resigned from her teaching
position to pursue graduate courses as her school did not grant leaves of absence.
The court upheld the deduction, saying that a year of graduate study under the
circumstances disclosed "is as much a normal incident of carrying on the business of
teaching as study during vacation periods." Id. at 294.
40 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1429 (1970).
41 Id. at 1429-30.
42 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968); see note 39 supra.
43 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1430. In Rev. Rul. 591, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 73,
the Commissioner declared that the Service would follow Furner, but only as to the
same facts presented, i.e., where a taxpayer in order to undertake education or training
to maintain or improve skills required in his employment temporarily ceases to engage
actively in that employment. The Ruling defines "temporary" as a suspension of a
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Proximate Relationship. If the taxpayer establishes that he was engaged in
a trade or business when he received the education, he must then establish
a direct relationship between the education and the skills of his employ-
ment. This is required by section 162(a) rather than any language in regu-
lation section 1.162-5; for an expense to be an ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expense, and, therefore, deductible under section 162(a), it must bear a
proximate and direct relationship to the taxpayer's trade or business. 44  In
James A. Carroll45 a policeman undertook a general college education, ma-
joring in philosophy, and sought to deduct the expenses under 162(a), claim-
ing the education aided him in his employment. In denying the deduction,
the court reiterated the point that before expenses can be considered "ordi-
nary and necessary" under section 162(a), there must be a direct relation-
ship to the taxpayer's trade or business, and "clearly there is only a remote
relationship between the study of Shakespeare's plays and the petitioner's
work as a policeman. '46 If the education has the requisite relationship to
the taxpayer's trade or business as discussed in Carroll, then the education
"maintains or improves the skills" as required by regulation section 1.162-5,
and the expense is an "ordinary and necessary" business expense under sec-
tion 162(a).
The expenses of a college education were held deductible under 162(a)
for a Baptist minister who claimed he undertook the education to "maintain
or improve" his skills as a pastor.47 The court stated that there was a direct
and proximate relationship between the education and the skills required in
his employment, in that psychology courses helped him deal with the prob-
lems of adolescents in his congregation; courses in teaching methods aided
him in carrying out his teaching duties; and the business-related courses en-
abled him to execute his financial responsibilities to the church.4" In Ben
H. Kim49 a Korean born citizen enrolled in law school and later was dis-
missed for academic deficiency. Kim sought readmission to the law
school but was informed that he needed to take certain preparatory courses
in logic, accounting, and advanced composition in order to facilitate his law
school studies. While taking these courses Kim was employed as an in-
surance adjuster. The court allowed Kim to deduct these expenses, saying
that although his "primary purpose" in taking those courses was to seek re-
year or less, after which the taxpayer resumes the same employment. See also Walter
T. Houston, Jr., 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 686 (1973), in which it was held that the
taxpayer had not reached a sufficient level of activity as an engineer to constitute the
carrying on of a trade or business of an engineer.
44 Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928); James A. Carroll, 51 T.C.
213 (1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1969).
45 51 T.C. 213 (1968).4 61d. at 218. See also Daniel J. Coughlin, III, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 459 (1969),
in which the court ruled that the taxpayer's college education was at best "tenuously
related" to his job as an insurance controls analyst, and, therefore, the expenses were
personal expenditures, and not ordinary and necessary business expenses.
47 John D. Glasgow, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 310 (1972).
48 Id. at 312. The court concluded by saying that "[allthough James A. Carroll
evinces our belief that there are few situations in which a deduction can be allowed
for the cost of an undergraduate college education, we believe that this is one case
where a deduction should be allowed." Id.
49 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 671 (1969).
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admission to law school, the education directly improved his skills as an
adjustor by helping him to "express himself orally, and to write in the Eng-
lish language . . . . "50 Under the 1958 regulations Kim would have been
denied the deduction for being unable to satisfy the "primary purpose" test;
but under the objective provisions of the 1967 regulations the education in fact
improved his skills required by his employment and was therefore deductible,
regardless of his subjective intent in taking the courses.
Skills Required by Employment. If the taxpayer establishes that the edu-
cation was proximately related to the skills of his employment, the skills
improved or maintained must be "those required by the individual in his
employment .. ".."51 In Paul Katz the term "required" was said to be a
"synonym for the Code section 162(a) term 'necessary,' "52 which has been
interpreted to mean appropriate or helpful in a taxpayer's business.5 3 The
taxpayer in Katz was not allowed to deduct the cost of flying lessons, even
though he operated an airplane in traveling to meet out-of-town clients for
his accounting firm. The court said, notwithstanding the use of the airplane
in the taxpayer's business, the skills required by his employment were ac-
counting services for his employer's clients, and the end results of his audits
were not affected by his mode of transportation.54
B. Express Requirements of the Employer
In Hill v. Commissioner55 the taxpayer was allowed to deduct summer
school expenses incurred in obtaining a renewal license for teaching, the basis
of the decision being that expenses undertaken to meet the requirements
of an existing employment status were not capital in nature because the tax-
payer was not seeking to qualify for a new position, and were not personal,
but were ordinary and necessary business expenses. The 1958 regulations
adopted the Hill rationale, requiring the taxpayer to show that the education
was undertaken primarily for the purpose of meeting the express require-
ments of a taxpayer's employer before the costs of such education were
deductible. 56
The 1967 regulations eliminate the requirement of "primary purpose,"
and in so doing, are more restrictive than the 1958 regulations in allowing
deductions for education that meet the express requirements of employers.
The provisions are very explicit in describing the deductibility of such educa-
tional costs. The taxpayer must undertake the education to meet express
requirements of his employer, the requirements must be imposed for bona
fide business purposes, and the requirements of the employer must be im-
posed as a condition to the "retention by the [taxpayer] of his established
50 Id. at 673.
51 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(1) (1967).
52 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 87, 89 (1968).
53 See note 4 supra.
54 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 89.
55 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).
56 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (2) (1958).
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employment relationship, status, or rate of compensation."57 Even though
the taxpayer satifies the conditions, no deduction will be allowed if the educa-
tion falls within one of the non-deductible categories. 5s
Express Requirements. In Lawrence H. Bakken5" the taxpayer was a full-
time engineer whose employment required him to analyze the feasibilities
of certain atomic weapons. He enrolled in law school night classes in order
to improve his ability to reason and communicate with fellow assistants.
Bakken's education was undertaken in response to a performance report
which concluded that his job performance was poor and recommended that
he undertake some program of self-improvement. Bakken claimed that the
expenditures for law school were incurred for the purpose of meeting the ex-
press requirements of his employer, imposed as a condition for the retention
of his job. The court agreed that the taxpayer's performance report was
tantamount to a "shape up or ship out" command, but that the regulations
required an "express education requirement." 60 At no time did his employer
expressly require Bakken to undertake any formal program of study in order
to retain his present job status.
The Tax Court has followed Bakken in applying a strict interpretation of
the term "required." An Air Force reserve officer sought to deduct the ex-
penses of a college education, claiming that such degree was a condition for
his remaining in the Air Force. 61 The Tax court recognized that the Air
Force encouraged officers without degrees to obtain them, and that the Air
Force would go to great lengths to implement this policy by allowing ex-
tended leaves of absence with pay. However, the court stated that, from
the mere fact that additional education was encouraged by his employer,
"we cannot conclude that William was pursuing his education to satisfy an
express requirement of his employer."'62
Business Purpose. The provision in the regulations that the express re-
quirement of the employer be imposed for a "bona fide business purpose of
the employer"68 serves the same function as requiring the education to be
proximately related to the skills of a taxpayer's employment under section
1.162-5(a)(1); that is, in order to deduct expenses under section 162(a)
of the Code, the expenditure must have a business origin and must be di-
rectly connected with a business activity of the taxpayer. 64 There must
be a greater connection between the express requirement and the taxpayer's
57 1d. § 1.162-5(c)(2) (1967).
58 Id, see notes 75-93 infra, and accompanying text.
59 51 T.C. 603 (1969).
60 Id. at 611. This result was foreshadowed by the court in Harold H. Davis, 38
T.C. 175 (1962), in which the Tax Court denied a deduction for research expenditures
even though the professor-taxpayer was subject to the tacit "publish or perish" require-
ment, saying that there was no express requirement at the university that he do such.
61 William Kirch, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 502 (1971).
62 Id. at 504. See also Richard P. Joyce, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1333 (1969) (a
promotion in the taxpayer's employment was more difficult without a degree).6 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(c)(2) (1967).
64 Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928); Amend v. Commissioner,
454 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1971).
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trade or business than the mere fact such requirement is imposed by the tax-
payer's employer. If the courts determine that the requirement is not im-
posed for the benefit of the taxpayer's employment, but rather it is for the
individual benefit of the taxpayer, then there is no business purpose in pur-
suing that requirement and the educational expenses incurred by the taxpayer
will be deemed personal and therefore non-deductible under 162(a).65
Retaining an Established Status. The most troublesome area to the taxpayer
in establishing a deduction under section 1.162-5 (a) (2) is proving that he is
meeting the express requirements of his employer in order to retain "an estab-
lished employment relationship, status, or rate of compensation."66  The
educational expenses must be incurred in fulfillment of express conditions sub-
sequent which are required to "retain" an existing employment relationship,
rather than conditions precedent which are required to "obtain" new em-
ployment. In Arthur M. Jungreis67 the Tax Court found that section 1.162-
5(a)(2) actually represented the requirement in section 162(a) of "carry-
ing on a trade or business." The court found that the educational ex-
penses incurred by Jungreis "were clearly for the purpose of 'commencing
and increasing,' rather than for 'carrying on' or 'preserving,' and therefore did
not constitute allowable deductions under section 162(a) of the Code sec-
tion 1.162-5(a)(2) of the 1967 regulations .... ,,68
The status of employment which the taxpayer seeks to retain must be a
current status. In Yaroslaw Horodysky9 the taxpayer sought to deduct
the expenses of law school. He had immigrated from Poland where he
had been a practicing attorney, but was not able to practice law since he
had not completed a formal law school curriculum, a prerequisite of ad-
mission to the Ohio Bar. The taxpayer claimed that his expenses were in-
curred to fulfill express requirements for the retention of his status as a law-
yer, attained originally in Europe. The court did not agree with the tax-
payer and interpreted the term "status" in section 1.162-5(c) (2) as a "sta-
tus" that existed at the time the educational expense in question was in-
curred. Therefore, when the taxpayer was in Ohio, he had no status as a
lawyer and regaining a status he once enjoyed in Poland was not the same
as retaining a current established status of employment.70
No "Primary Purpose." The regulations state that "in no event . . . is a
deduction allowable for expenditures for education which, even though edu-
cation required by the employer . . . are within one of the categories of
non-deductible expenditures .... -71 By eliminating the need to as-
certain the taxpayer's primary purpose in undertaking the education, the
65See, e.g., Adelson v. United States, 342 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1965). European
educational travel expenses were held to be primarily for the benefit of the taxpayer,
and, therefore, non-deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.
6 6 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (2) (1967).
67 55 T.C. 581 (1970).
68 Id. at 589.
69 54 T.C. 490 (1970).
70 ld. at 492.
71 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (2) (1967).
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1967 provision which requires express requirements of employment is
more restrictive than the similar provision in the 1958 regulations. A case
decided under the 1958 regulations allowed flight engineers to deduct their
expenses in obtaining commercial pilots' licenses, even though as a result of
such training they became qualified for a co-pilot's position. The court found
that their primary purpose in undertaking the education was to meet express
requirements established for their positions as flight engineers and not to ad-
vance to the position of co-pilot.72 The 1967 regulations, as interpreted in
Fleischer v. Commissioner,73 would require a different result.
Under these new regulations, even if the course of study taxpayer pur-
sued was required by his employer as a condition of employment and
was pursued by him exclusively for the purpose of satisfying his
employer's requirements, the expenditures would not be deductible if
taxpayer qualified for a new trade or business as a result of the edu-
cation.74
C. Non-deductible Educational Expenses
There is actually a two-step process for the taxpayer to comply with be-
fore he may deduct the expenses of an education. He must first establish
the applicability of one of the deductible expense categories. If the ex-
pense so qualifies, it will be deductible under section 162(a) unless a court
thereafter determines that the educational expense falls within one of the
non-deductible classifications, in which case the deduction is automatically
denied.
The regulations attempt to distinguish between those educational expenses
which are "ordinary and necessary" expenses of a trade or business, and those
which are personal and capital expenditures. This distinction is the basis for
denying a deduction for expenses of an education which satisfies minimum
requirements in the taxpayer's employment, or qualifies him for a new trade
or business. An expense for education which qualifies a taxpayer for his
intended trade or business is so inherently personal and capital in nature
that it is not a deductible expense even though it maintains or improves the
skills required by the individual in his employment, or meets the express
requirements of the individual's employer. As discussed in James A.
Carroll,75 the 1967 regulations, by providing two categories of non-deductible
educational expenses, recognize the essential balance between section 162 on
one hand, and sections 262 and 26376 on the other hand, in ascertaining
the deductibility of educational expenses.
72 Marvin LeRoy Lund, 46 T.C. 321, 331 (1966).
73 403 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1968).
74 Id. at 407.
75 51 T.C. 213 (1968).76 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 262 disallows any deduction for any personal, living,
or family expenses, unless elsewhere provided for in subtitle A, ch. 1, subch. A, part
IX of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954. Id. § 263(a) disallows a deduction for capital ex-
penditures because such expenses may be directly related to an increase in value or
permanent improvement of the person's condition or property.
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Minimum Educational Requirements. The first category of non-deducti-
ble educational expenses in the regulations denies deductibility of expendi-
tures for an education which is required of the taxpayer in order to "meet
the minimum educational requirements for qualification in his employment
or other trade or business."' 77 The minimum education necessary to qualify
for the taxpayer's position is to be determined from such factors as the re-
quirements of the employer, the applicable law and regulations pertaining
to the taxpayer's trade or business, and the standards of the profession in-
volved. The sole fact that the taxpayer is already performing similar ser-
vices in an employment status "does not establish that he has met the minimum
educational requirements for qualification in that employment. 78
The taxpayer in Arthur M. Jungreis79 was a teaching assistant at a uni-
versity who sought to deduct the expenses of graduate studies in pursuance
of a Doctor of Philosophy degree, an express requirement for promotion to
the position of full time faculty member. He argued that his education was
not undertaken to meet minimum educational requirements, because he was
already qualified at the position of teacher of the university. The court re-
jected his argument, saying that Jungreis had misinterpreted the meaning of
"minimum education necessary to qualify for a position"8 0 as signifying any
position at his place of employment. A teaching assistantship, while a
"position" at the university, was not the same "position" as full professor,
which enjoyed greater privileges and advantages and required greater quali-
fications. Therefore the taxpayer, in seeking to qualify for a professorship,
was undertaking education in order to meet the minimum educational re-
quirements for the position of full professor, which he had not met by virtue
of his being employed as a teaching assistant.8 '
Qualification for a New Trade or Business. The second category of non-
deductible educational expenses consists of those expenditures made by the
taxpayer for an education which will lead to qualifying him in a new trade
or business. The regulations attempt to provide guidelines for determining
when the taxpayer is qualified for a new trade or business by virtue of his
education. For an employee, a change of duties does not constitute a new
trade or business, provided "the new duties involve the same general type
of work as is involved in the individual's present employment. '8 2
The cases suggest that taxpayers are most often denied their educational
expense deductions under the "new trade or business" category when they
attempt to prove their education was undertaken to maintain or improve their
present job skills.8 3  The courts find that, although the education is proxi-
77 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2) (1967).
78 Id.
79 55 T.C. 581 (1970).80 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2) (1967).
81 See also John C. Ford, 56 T.C. 1300 (1971), in which the taxpayer was held
to have met the minimum educational requirements for qualification as a secondary
school teacher before undertaking the education in question.82 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3) (1967).
83 See, e.g., James K. Curtin, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 73 (1972); David N. Bodley,
56 T.C. 1357 (1971).
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mately related to the taxpayer's employment, he is qualified for a new job as
a result of undertaking the education. Under the objective standards of the
1967 regulations, such a finding by the court leads to an automatic denial of
the educational expense deduction, whereas under the "primary purpose"
test of the 1958 regulations, the results were not always so harsh.8 4
Under section 1.162-5(b) (3) .the sole issue is whether or not the taxpayer
is qualified for a new trade or business after receiving the education in ques-
tion. An inventive argument in this regard was posed by the taxpayer in
Jeffrey L. Weiler.85  The taxpayer relied on the language of the regula-
tions, stating that a change of duties does not constitute a new trade or busi-
ness where the new duties involve the same general work. Weiler was a
certified public accountant employed as an internal revenue agent. He en-
rolled in law school and sought to deduct his expenses for undertaking an
education that maintained or improved his skills in the area of the tax
law. The Commissioner contended that the taxpayer's study of law would
qualify him as an attorney, and therefore, under the standards of section
1.162-5 (b) (3), the taxpayer was not entitled to the deduction since his law
school education is a program of study "which will lead to qualifying him
in a new trade or business."8 6 Weiler, however, argued to the contrary, say-
ing that his trade or business was that of a "federal income tax professional,"
within which field were tax attorneys, tax accountants, and internal revenue
agents. A lateral shift to a tax attorney status was not the same as entering a
new trade or business because the new duties involved the same general
work. The Tax Court disagreed, holding that no matter what the taxpayer's
present employment was his course of study would qualify him as an attor-
ney, which was "a trade or business separate and distinct from that in which
he is now engaged."8s7 The objective standards of section 1.162-5(b)(3)
therefore required a denial of his attempted expense deduction.
To determine whether there is a mere change of duties by the taxpayer
as a result of the education or whether the education qualifies him for a new
trade or business, the courts decide if the education will qualify the taxpayer
for a different profession than the one he occupied before the education was
undertaken. Criteria used by the courts in determining this issue include
comparing the responsibilities of the new job to those of the prior one, ex-
amining the tasks to be performed by the taxpayer in his new position, and
most importantly, any significant opportunities available to the taxpayer as a
result of the education that were not open to him in his prior position. 8
The effect of new opportunities becoming available to the taxpayer after
the education is not dependent upon whether he actually pursues these op-
portunities. The regulations speak only of a "program of study . . . which
84 See notes 18-23 supra, and accompanying text.
85 54 T.C. 398 (1970).
86Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3) (1967).
87 54 T.C. at 402.
88 See Ronald F. Weiszmann, 52 T.C. 1106, 1110 (1969), af 'd, 443 F.2d 29 (9th
Cir. 1971), for an example of how the courts determine whether the taxpayer is
qualified for a new trade or business as a result of the education in question. See
also Ronald F. Weiszmann, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1201 (1972), af 'd, 483 F.2d 817(10th Cir. 1973).
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will lead to qualifying him in a new trade or business."89 Thus, the argument
put forth by the taxpayer, that even though he has a law degree he has not
passed the bar exam and does not intend to practice law, is not upheld by
the courts.90  The denial of the expense deduction under section 1.162-
5(b) (3) is not, however, predicated on whether the taxpayer receives a de-
gree, for the regulations provide -that the two categories of deductible expenses
are ordinary and necessary business expenses "even though the education
may lead to a degree." 91 The emphasis is on the "program of study" pur-
sued by the taxpayer; if the education will lead to qualifying the taxpayer
for a new trade or business, then the expenses of such education are non-
deductible, regardless of whether he receives a degree upon completion of
his schooling.
Taxpayers had greater success under the 1958 regulations when they
sought to deduct the expenses of an education which would qualify them
for a new degree. Under the 1958 provision, a deduction was denied only
when the expenditures were for an education "undertaken primarily for the
purpose of obtaining a new position or substantial advancement in posi-
tion."'9 2 In Richard M. Baum 93 the expenses of law school for an insurance
claims adjuster were held to be ordinary and necessary business expenses
even though he was qualified for a new position as a result of the education,
because the taxpayer did not intend to leave his present job and seek the
position of practicing attorney. The same result would obviously not be
reached under the current regulations.
III. APPLICATION OF THE 1967 REGULATIONS
The provisions of the regulations pertaining to educational expenses have
been separated and explained by categories according to deductible or non-
deductible expenses, with accompanying case law pointing out the difficult
problem areas faced by the taxpayers in seeking to deduct their educational
expenses under section 162(a). But in order to understand the present
status of educational expense deductions, it is necessary to view the regula-
tions in their entirety as they are applied to specific educational endeavors.
Travel as a Form of Education. The 1967 regulations are considerably
more liberal than the 1958 provisions in allowing expense deductions for
travel taken as a form of education. 94 Expenses for travel as a form of edu-
cation, including travel while on sabbatical leave, are deductible only to the
extent that the travel expenses are directly related to the taxpayer's trade or
business. According to the regulations, only that portion of travel which di-
rectly maintains or improves skills required by the taxpayer's employer or
8 9 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3) (1967).
9 0 See 52 T.C. at 1111.9 1 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (1967).92 1d. § 1.162-5(b) (1958).
93 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 206 (1964).
94 The scope of this discussion is limited to the costs of the trip that qualify as
educational. Expenditures for meals and lodging are also deductible under certain
circumstances under § 162(a), but are not relevant to this analysis.
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trade or business shall be considered "directly related to the duties of the
individual in his employment. . . .95
The test for the deductibility of travel expenses, claimed as educational
expenses, involves the same problem encountered earlier under section
1.162-5(a)(1); namely whether there is a direct and proximate relation-
ship between the educationl (travel) and the skills of the taxpayer's trade or
business. If the requisite relationship is not found by the courts, then the
expenses are personal and not deductible as ordinary and necessary business
expenses under section 162(a).96 If the taxpayer can prove that the educa-
tion in the form of travel directly maintained or improved the skills required
by his trade or business, then that portion of the travel will be deductible as
an ordinary and necessary business expense.97
Law School Expenses. Deductions for law school expenses are nonexistent
under the 1967 regulations. 98 The taxpayer may deduct educational ex-
penses only if they qualify under one of the deductible categories, and also
avoid the non-deductible classifications. Therefore, if a taxpayer is pursuing
a course of education which will qualify him for a new trade or business,
his expenditures are not deductible, even though his studies are required by
his employer and he does not intend to pursue the new endeavor for which
he becomes qualified. Under the objective standards of the 1967 regula-
tions the only criterion for the courts to apply is that the education qualifies,
or will qualify, the taxpayer for a trade or business separate and distinct from
the one in which he was engaged before undertaking the education, 99 and
this requirement is satisfied by entering law school.
College Expenses. Expenditures for college educations, with rare excep-
tions, 100 have been held to be personal expenses and therefore not deductible
95 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(d) (1967).96 In James L. Denison, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1074 (1971), the Tax Court found
that a ten-week trip by the taxpayer-teacher could not be deducted as an educational
expense under § 162(a). The taxpayer attempted to prove the business nature of the
trip by claiming he took slides for presentation to his classes. The court said that the
relationship between the nature of the trip (a 10,000-mile tour to take slides) and
the improvement of his skills as a teacher was not sufficiently direct to justify a
business expense deduction. See also Baker v. Commissioner, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
962 (1973); 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 466 (1973).
97This involves an apportionment between the deductible and non-deductible
portions of the travel claimed as educational. In Edwin F. Krist, 31 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 397 (1972), the court said an allocation of the taxpayer's trip must be madebetween the portion that involved personal expenditures, and those expenditures that
were directly related to her job as a teacher. The taxpayer was able to establish that
80% of her trip contained activities that were directly related to her employment,
and that such activities maintained and improved her skills required by such em-
ployment. In upholding the 80% expense deduction, the court looked to the informa-
tion learned by the taxpayer that pertained to her teaching position, and to the travel
accommodations of the taxpayer in comparison to the other tourists. Id. at 400.98 See, e.g., Collins v. Commissioner, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 890 (1973); Lunds-
ford v. Commissioner, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 64 (1973); Curtin v. Commissioner, 30CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 73 (1972); David N. Bodley, 56 T.C. 1357 (1971); Jeffery L.
Weiler, 54 T.C. 398 (1970); Burke W. Bradley, Jr., 54 T.C. 216 (1970); Ronald
F. Weiszmann, 52 T.C. 1106 (1969), affd, 443 F.2d (9th Cir. 1971).99 See notes 82-93 supra, and accompanying text.10 0 See notes 47-48 supra, and accompanying text.
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under section 162(a). The difficulty in sustaining the deduction does not lie
in avoiding the non-deductible categories, but in qualifying under one of
the deductible expense categories. The taxpayer cannot establish either that
he is engaged in a trade or business concurrent with his attendance at col-
lege, 1 1 or that the education bears a direct and proximate relationship to
the skills of his employment.' 0 2 One court indicated that most people "se-
cure a general college education before they commence their life's employ-
ment, and it is generally accepted that obtaining such education is a personal
responsibility in preparing for one's career. Should the result be any differ-
ent for the man who goes to college after commencing work?"' 10 3
Graduate Study for Teachers. There are two major obstacles facing the
professor who seeks to deduct the expenses of postgraduate studies under
the 1967 regulations. He must be engaged in the "trade or business" of
teaching while he is taking the postgraduate studies, and such studies must
not be in satisfaction of minimum educational requirements for qualification
in a teaching position.
A teacher cannot argue that his postgraduate studies maintain or improve
the skill in his employment' 04 if he has no "employment" when he incurs
the education. The problem of whether the taxpayer is engaged in the
trade or business of teaching commonly occurs in three situations: when the
graduate studies are completed before the taxpayer actually begins his career
in teaching;'105 when the taxpayer is actively engaged in the teaching pro-
fession, but leaves temporarily to pursue graduate studies, and returns to the
same trade or business of teaching; 106 or when the professor is actively em-
ployed, but resigns in order to pursue full-time graduate studies, with or
without the intention of returning to the profession of teaching.10 7 The
101Thomas A. Gallery, 57 T.C. 257 (1971). The taxpayer was held not to have
been engaged in a trade or business when he incurred the college expenses, and there-
fore the expenditures were personal and non-deductible.
102 James A. Carroll, 51 T.C. 213 (1968). See also notes 59-62 supra and accom-
panying text.
103 51 T.C. at 216.
104 This would allow the teacher to deduct his educational expenses under §
1.162-5(a)(1) of the Regulations, provided the non-deductible categories did not
apply to his situation.
105 In Robert F. Casey, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 60 (1971), the taxpayer was not
allowed to deduct the expenses incurred while attending teacher's college because
he did not become actively employed as a teacher until the course work was completed.
The taxpayer in Don E. Wyatt, 56 T.C. 517 (1971), was employed as a teacher
before resigning and assuming a secretarial position. After four years of absence from
the teaching position, she incurred educational expenses in preparation for returning
to a teaching job. The Tax Court held that the expenses were not incurred while
carrying on the trade or business of being a teacher but were in preparation for
resuming such occupation and, therefore, were not deductible as business expenses
under § 1.162-5(a)(1) of the regulations.106 This includes the leave-of-absence situation. In Rev. Rul. 591, 1968-2 CUM.
BULL. 73, the Commissioner acquiesced in the Furner case, which held that if a tax-
payer temporarily ceases to engage actively in his employment in order to pursue
education that maintains or improves his skills, his educational expenses are deductible.
107 The "temporariness" distinction which allows a taxpayer to be engaged in
carrying on a trade or business for purposes of § 162(a), even though he has technically
ceased his active participation, does not apply in this situation. In Peter G. Corbett, 55
T.C. 884 (1971), the teacher terminated all relations with her employer-college to
seek a graduate degree. The court held that because the taxpayer did not teach during
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teacher or professor must be engaged in the "trade or business" of teaching
when he incurs the educational expense, because for an expenditure to be
deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense under section
162(a) it must relate to activities which amount to a present carrying on of a
trade or business.' 08
If the teacher or professor is engaged in a trade or business and he under-
takes an education which relates to his skills as a teacher, he often is denied
the expense deduction because the courts determine that the education
meets minimum requirements for qualification in the teacher's trade or busi-
ness. The regulations provide that the minimum level of education, in
terms of aggregate hours or degrees, is that required by the institution for
employment at that position when the taxpayer is hired. If the institution has
no minimum requirements for teaching positions, -then the taxpayer is deemed
to have met the minimum educational requirements when he becomes a
permanent faculty member. This is determined by such factors as the prac-
tices of the institution, whether the taxpayer has tenure, or whether he has a
vote in faculty affairs.' 09
Under the non-deductible category of expenses for an education that
qualifies a taxpayer for a new trade or business, the regulations provide that
a change in duties does not constitute a new trade or business where the new
duties involve the same general type of work as the prior duties. With re-
spect to teaching, the regulations state that "all teaching and related duties
shall be considered to involve the same general type of work.""10 Thus,
for the teacher who incurs an educational expense and then returns to the
field of teaching, whether or not the education qualifies him for a new trade
or business will never be at issues in denying or sustaining the deduction.
However, if the teacher is required to meet minimum educational require-
ments in order to achieve the "change of duties," his deduction will not be
allowed,' 1 ' regardless of the favorable provisions in section 1.162-5(b)(3).
IV. CONCLUSION
The regulations under section 162(a) were promulgated to establish the
circumstances under which educational expenditures satisfy the requirements
of trade or business expenses. With the elimination of the "primary pur-
pose" test, the 1967 regulations avoid the litigation problems that plagued
the courts under the 1958 regulations with respect to the taxpayer's subjec-
tive intent in undertaking the education. Unfortunately, the 1967 regulations
also disallow many deductions that were once allowed.
This trend is attributable to denying expenditures for any education which
qualifies the taxpayer for a new trade or business, irrespective of the tax-
her graduate studies, was not on a leave of absence from her teaching duties, and was
not actively seeking another teaching position, she was not engaged in the trade or
business of teaching when she incurred the educational expenses.
108 See notes 37-43 supra, and accompanying text.





payer's intended use of the education. The inequities that result from this
provision are apparent upon consideration of the rationale set forth by the
regulations for denying the deduction-that such expenditures represent per-
sonal expenditures, or constitute an inseparable aggregate of personal and
capital expenditures. If a taxpayer has met the tests under 162(a), then
the educational expense is not personal; yet, the regulations deny the deduc-
tion, presumably because the expense is capital in nature. And since the
number of years that the education will be used by the taxpayer in his trade
or business is indeterminable, he may not recover his expenses through cap-
italization and amortization. In other words, the 1967 regulations fail to con-
sider situations where an education is a legitimate business expense accord-
ing to the taxpayer's actual use of the education, and in doing so, overreach
the already rigorous tests of section 162(a).
